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1. Why digital realism is not indexical 
I've been discussing time and digital media for a while now. It strikes me 
that alongside arguments we need to  make about, for example, the crash 
as a specifically digital temporality that brings the ephemeral to  centre 
stage, we also need to  understand what history means, no  longer as a 
mode of monumentalisation, but as a coming to terms with the kind of 
loss that confronts us everyday when a freeze or a crash takes our hard 
work away. As i t  happens, I bumped into an  essay a few days ago that  
provides the opportunity t o  think over the larger scale implications of 
transience as a characteristic of digital aesthetics. 
The essay appears in a new publication from the Edinburgh College of 
Art, TwoNineTwo. In the opening essay of the launch issue, Paul Wille- 
men asks some searching questions about the risks that emerge as the dig- 
ital media alter the indexicality of the analogue. In the process of analysis 
he returns to Eisenstein, because of 
the suspicion that sooner or later, some techno-fetishist is bound to invoke, 
abusively, Eisenstein's name in a celebration of the internet or computer- 
based art. I suspect that for this abuse of Eisenstein, his particular notion 
of mimesis, commented on by Misha Yampolsky in Eisenstein Reconsid- 
ered, will be invoked. Yampolsky quoted Eisenstein's speech to the film- 
makers of La Sarraz in 1929: "The age of form is drawing to a close. We 
are penetrating behind appearance into the principle of appearance. In 
doing so we are mastering it:' Yampolsky then went on to argue that for 
Eisenstein, the issue was to represent "the essential bone structure" under- 
pinning and shaping reality rather than its surface appearance. No doubt 
some techno-fetishist will latch on to that formulation to claim that this is 
precisely what digital imaging and 'new media' enable. This claim may be 
further elaborated with reference to Eisenstein's emphasis on drawing, 
painting and the iconic quality of the cinematic and the photographic 
image (Willemen 2000,7-8). 
My interest is piqued, since I quoted this rather obscure article from a 
1988 volume of conference proceedings in my book on Digital Aesthetics 
a few years ago. This was how I deployed the quote in a chapter on  Vir- 
tual Realism, part of whose mission was t o  establish that mechanical per- 
ception in both analogue and digital forms retains its indexical quality 
through the relationship established among images, a relationship which, 
I argued, forms a 'society' which enables a socialised mode of communi- 
cation otherwise disenabled by the hyperindividuation characteristic of 
accelerated modernity. 
In his debates with the radical Kino-Eye director Dziga Vertov, Eisenstein 
replied to criticisms that his story-films were in hock to the fictionalisa- 
tions of the entertainment film by critiquing Vertov's espousal of the docu- 
mentary. Raw reality, unorganised, could never achieve maximal 
effectivity, and could never form part of the overall subordination of the 
film's moments to its architectonics, its montage (Eisenstein 1988). 
Instead, Eisenstein argued the case for a cinema which would escape the 
magical powers of mimesis through an emphasis on composition, on the 
mise en sckne, the frame, the shot, the editing and the whole film. Docu- 
mentary was mere imitation. Like the sympathetic magic that drives a 
betrayed lover to destroy photos of the philanderer, or the symbolic objects 
surrounding a dead pharaoh, or the stock markets trade in "objects that 
only exist on paper," for the documentary, "The difference between form 
and reality is non-existant" (Eisenstein 1993, 68). The speculative regime 
dreams of managing reality through formal manipulations. But these magi- 
cal administrations, in mirroring form alone, ape events without grasping 
their structure. In their place Eisenstein argues for a vision that pierces the 
secrets of matter, that reveals what lies beneath the surface, the bones 
beneath the skin (see Yampolsky 1993). He declaims "Mastery of principle 
is the real mastery of objects" (Eisenstein 1993, 67), and in an early draft 
even speaks of "Man as means." Not even the human is sacrosanct in the 
demand for a visual art dedicated to unearthing the paucity of the present 
and the immanence of the future.. . Eisenstein's purpose as pedagogue and 
practitioner was to move from [the] purity of autonomous illumination to 
a social relation between filmmaker and audiences through the establish- 
ment of a social relation between shots, a relation which would transform 
the contents of the individual frames or the sequence. In place of the eco- 
nomic model of exchange, Eisenstein aims for the social model of dialogue 
between frames. Unlike Baudrillard's succession and erasure of every image 
by the next, Eisenstein creates a society among his images. However, the 
internationalist ambition of Eisenstein's cinema bred a sense of cinema as 
universal language, or more specifically, a universal translation machine, 
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whose purpose, to join human to human in the revolution, transcended 
and subordinated the claims of images to their own reasons for being. In 
the attempt to make a generalisable technique, montage falls prey to ratio- 
nalist universalism (Cubitt 1998, 43-4). 
The model in the back of my mind was that proposed by Walter Ben- 
jamin in his essay "The Task of the Translator," which offers a metaphor 
which seems as apposite to the transitions between analogue and digital 
as it is to both the problem of translation and the ethics of interpretation: 
Fragments of a vessel which are to be glued together must match one 
another in the smallest details, although they need not be like one another. 
In the same way a translation, instead of resembling the meaning of the 
original, must lovingly and in detail incorporate the original's mode of sig- 
nification, thus making both the original and the translation recognizable 
as fragments of a greater language, just as fragments are part of a larger 
vessel (Benjamin 1969, 78). 
The great difference between the Eisenstein and Benjamin is that the 
latter believes the universal language is made in the process of translation, 
while for Eisenstein it is already presumed as a Leninist class faculty that 
needs only to be mobilised in the machinery of the Party. 
One of the problems with Willemen's approach is that it defines its aes- 
thetic in terms of indexicality: in terms of visual coding. This is already 
weak as a way of understanding some key codes of cinema, especially 
editing but also music. It is entirely too parochial a view for digital aes- 
thetics, which is only partially visual. It is also, very obviously, sonorous. 
Crucially, it is also dependent on a set of practices which humanist intel- 
lectuals have become loath to discuss: practices associated with the work- 
place, notably cartography, cataloguing and double-entry book-keeping. 
In geographic information systems (GIS), statistical data is arranged in 
correlation with spatial data to provide maps for scientific and marketing 
purposes; the database is an extended catalogue that adds record-keeping, 
filing and complex, multi-dimensional records to the old index card, and 
uses early twentieth-century concepts of library information retrieval to 
power search engines and bots; while the accountancy procedures became 
the Lotus 1-2-3 definitive killer app for the first desktop machines. In this 
context, trying to define digital media by analogy with storytelling and 
realist depiction is like trying to define an ocean liner by means of its fur- 
niture. 
Most of all, however, the humanist approach advocated by Willemen 
misses entirely what Gelernter (1998) calls the aesthetics of computing: 
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the specific elegance, simplicity, effectiveness and sheer aesthetic pleasure 
of software design. Why is Windows 2000 so much less attractive an envi- 
ronment than Mac 1984? Why is Word 98 the clumsiest of all possible 
word-processors (with the exception, of course, of the next version of 
Word)? Gelernter uses Ted Nelson's term, "featuritis." Critical Art 
Ensemble (1996) use the phrase "redundant functionality" for the same 
phenomenon: the excrescence of features and functions added on to the 
basic programme, ostensibly to increase its usefulness but actually to get 
it to do useless and unwanted actions that eat memory and clutter the 
screen with pointless objects and unnecessary advice (I particularly dislike 
Word 98's desire to correct my English and its presumption that I want to 
edit whole words rather than individual letters-yes I know I can turn it 
off, but it takes fifteen precious minutes burrowing in appallingly nested 
sub-menus to find the button, and meanwhile I can't even preview the 
font menu). 
Digital aesthetics has to do with the engineering and technology of 
computing as well as the superfices of image and sound: the Jodi site, for 
example, makes a wholly different sense if you use View Source to  dip 
into the code beneath the apparently random scatter of blinking ascii 
characters. What is at stake is code, not representation. Tim Druckrey's 
1995 Ars Electronica paper catches a critical aspect of this when he 
argues that "Programming determines a set of conditions in which the 
represented is formed as an instruction, while language destabilizes the 
conditions through the introduction of formations in which the repre- 
sented is extended" (Druckrey 1999, 311). The imbalance of instruction 
and extra-textual formations forms a new crisis in the theory of represen- 
tation, itself already reeling under the twin blows of consumer capitalism 
and the dead-end theorisation of simulation. The act of interpretation 
does not become impossible, faced with the interminable question of the 
truth of the representation, but becomes necessary, since the construction 
of truth now becomes an extra-textual effort engaging anyone who comes 
into contact with it. 
As anyone who has ever struggled with a balance sheet will know, 
accountancy is a creative art. Without abuse of the facts, there are legiti- 
mate ways in which a company's performance can be shown to have 
resulted in a profit, a loss or a break-even, according to the audience for 
whom the figures are intended. A struggling charity, for example, has to 
avoid profit in order to keep its tax status, generate loss in order to 
attract key funding, and show profit in order to keep its directors and its 
bank manager happy. This is achieved not by changing the facts but by 
using different formulae to account for them. The spreadsheet has 
become a hermeneutic engine for testing out possible modes of account- 
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ing for a year's trading: to ensure that a movie makes a record profit for 
Variety, but nevertheless never succeeds so well that players with points 
in it take significant revenue streams. It's illegal to alter the facts but mas- 
saging them is the reason we pay for accountants. The effort it takes the 
lay observer to grapple with these issues and to run through the what-if 
scenarios that accountants love is precisely the operation Druckrey hints 
at: the difference between instruction as machine coding and interpreta- 
tion as the destabilisation of encoding in language. 
The digital, like the accountancy spreadsheets that are such a feature of 
it, is indeed indexical, but it is not engaged with the visual regimes of 
resemblance, rather with semblance as such, which, considered as the exe- 
cution of a set of instructions, is also doubled by a mimetic performance, 
rather as a recording of a piano recital is a semblance of the score but a 
mimesis of its execution. In fact the digital record is less perfect than the 
analogue, or rather has abandoned the claim to perfectibility of the ana- 
logue-and this at its heart, not in the technoboosterism of "very soon we 
will be able to.. ." that Willemen quite rightly castigates-though for the 
wrong reasons. To extend the metaphor of the piano recording, the mim- 
icry of idealised acoustic conditions in the recording studio chronicled by 
Chanan is wasted effort: as Altman argues, the fallibility of playback 
ensures that the acoustic I hear is the acoustic of my living room, not that 
of the Cleveland Orchestra. In effect, the greater the attempted control 
over reproduction, the more control is handed over to the receiver, who is 
thereby forced into the position of interpreter. This is just one aspect of 
the democratisation process in the digital domain. 
Indexicality is in any case only one aspect of a cinema which, in the 
digital era, is also transformed as to its iconic and symbolic functioning. 
Willemen makes a play for the centrality of Charles Sanders Peirce's cate- 
gory of the index in film but does so in a naively realist tradition that 
ignores the power of Peirce's semiotics as a triadic rather than Saussurean 
and binary structure. Willemen wants a 'return' to the index, claiming 
that any image taken with a camera has an irreducible relation with 
embodied and physical reality which is precious, vital and political, and 
which digital media have destroyed. But a little media-social history will 
help understand why the index was never unique and never an unmitigat- 
edly good thing. The camera and wet photography throve in almost 
exactly the same chronological period as the ideology of privacy. One of 
the cheerier ways of looking at the 'death' of photography is that it coin- 
cides with the termination of bourgeois individualism and its abuse of 
identity and its sacrosanctity as a defence for private dishonesty and 
domestic violence. The rise of the manipulable image and the emergence 
of a manipulable (schizophrenic) self are synchronous developments: 
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what is occurring is not the end of truth but the end of an ideology of 
identity. Identity of the subject to itself has acted as the ground of truth 
since Descartes, and it is this ground that Willemen mourns. The law too 
has been grounded on the concept of individual identity as the basis of 
truth in arguments over privacy, intellectual and private property. As the 
measure of truth as identity breaks down-the Microsoft trial is a won- 
derfully public forum for demonstrating the imbecility of identifying truth 
with property-the rewriting of photographic truth becomes symptomatic 
of a global and highly political change in the nature of truth, identity and 
property. The logic of the digital, with its ease or surveillance, fraud and 
hacking, denies the sole right of ownership: if anything, the digital 
belongs, in its wider sense, to the dialectic of liberation in a way which a 
century of cinema has clearly failed to achieve. If the digital is no longer a 
credible medium for indexical representations, what does this mean for 
the surveillant regime of the passport photograph? Surely it requires more 
than an education that promotes "assessing the 'likely' verisimilitude of 
any account or representation of the world" (the scare quotes, which are 
so revealing, are Willemen's own): surely it demands an education based 
not on picturing and mastery over the world, something more like an edu- 
cation based on the power to communicate in a globally interdependent 
society? 
There's another curious and rather typical elision in decrying block- 
buster cinema as 'physical sensations' as opposed to the 'emotive-intellec- 
tual' cinema. The 'sound prisons' of club culture Willemen vilifies can 
surely be understood analogously as the utopian if temporary promotion 
of psycho-somatic wholeness in an age in which its very possibility is 
erased in daily life. But just at the moment in which you think you have 
caught the argument: digital media are too embodied, too physical, not 
intellectual and emotive enough, we discover that the tirade will be 
directed towards the exclusion of embodiment from digital media. What 
is going on inside this apparent contradiction? 
What Willemen seems to be missing is the negativity of the body in 
contemporary society, joining in the industrial production of nostalgia for 
real bodies that began in the gay clubs and gyms of the 1970s and now 
permeates commercial culture. Willemen's love for the lost bodies of an 
imaginary working class, his promotion of their images as innocent trig- 
gers of 'intellectual-emotive' responses, reeks of the closet. The only way 
the body can permeate the cinematic OR the digital; is either as data- 
image (Mark Poster's [l9901 term for the cloud of statistics which gathers 
around any participant in consumerism) or as absence. If anything it is 
the latter that marks the genuine digital art of the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries. We cannot wish away the division of body and 
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mind effected in the foundations of modernity-that wishing is character- 
istic of the bogus, content-full utopia castigated by Bloch and realised in 
the fashion industry with its cheesy evocations of blue-collar sweat in the 
processing of gym-and-isotonics-sculpted models. The contemporary 
body is itself untrustworthy and beyond the realms of truth because it is 
every bit as manipulable as the digital image of it. The body no longer 
counts politically: it is a construct of a historical process of abstraction 
noted already by Marx in the sublimation of labour power from the 
labouring bodies of the proletariat. The body becomes a disposable good 
under industrial capital, and an investment under finance capital. On the 
way, it moves from reproductive to service to consumer sectors of the 
economy, concluding an arc from use via exchange to sign. In the re-engi- 
neering of contemporary capital, even that level of value is subsumed 
within a higher order of abstraction, that of the statistically normative 
database, where the body takes on the role of statistical fiction. The oper- 
ation of digital media in recording, analysing and extrapolating from data 
is not an attack on indexicality: it is the new order of the index, and one 
entirely in tune with a trajectory already established in the twist of pho- 
tography towards the instrumental rationality of the surveillance state in 
the middle of the nineteenth century. It is only a higher order of realism. 
Like so many Luddite commentators, Willemen pretends to be obsessed 
with work, but not with looking at the changing conditions of work. 
Instead his major concern, like those of Kirkpatrick Sale (1996), Neil 
Postman (1992) and Sven Birkerts (1994), is with protecting the rights of 
an intellectual caste defined only negatively but disallowed the negating 
role that a true dialectical model would demand of them. Such arguments 
are stranded defending what Caldwell had already defined in 1939 as a 
dying culture. In fact, what all four fear is not the demise of indexicality 
but the rise of iconicity, "the diagrammatic sign or icon" (Peirce 1991a, 
181). But what if the true connection is, or the possible or potential rela- 
tion were, symbolic, "which signifies its object by means of an association 
of ideas" (Peirce 1991a, 181). This after all was Eisenstein's basic tactic in 
the montage aesthetic. The problem is that the symbolic relation in film 
turns indices into symbols-the image of this babushka becomes the type 
of all victims of Cossack oppression (and incidentally all Cossacks are 
denied specificity). Willemen's intellectual-emotive cinema is itself at odds 
with the embodiment he ascribes to indexicality, because every pho- 
tographed body, as soon as it escapes from the purely representational 
regime of the index "without definition" (achieved for the first and last 
time in cinema in the Sortie des usines Lumikres) becomes symbolic, and 
as such throws itself into the regime of "association of ideas or habitual 
connections" (Peirce 1991a, 181)-the realm of metaphor OR, and this is 
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the danger Willemen fears, the realm of ideology. Here is how Adorno 
expresses it: 
[Mlontage disposes over the elements that make up the reality of an 
unchallenged common sense, either to transform their intention or, at best, 
to awaken their latent language. It is powerless, however, in so far as it is 
unable to explode the individual elements. It is precisely montage that is to 
be criticised for possessing the remains of a complaisant irrationalism, to 
adaptation to material that is delivered ready-made from outside the 
work.. . the principle of montage therefore became that of construction. 
There is no denying that even in the principle of construction, in the disso- 
lution of materials and their subordination to an imposed unity, once again 
something smooth, harmonistic, a quality of pure logicality is conjured up 
that seeks to establish itself as ideology. It is the fatality of all contempo- 
rary art that it is contaminated by the untruth of the ruling totality 
(Adorno 1997, 57). 
Adorno's complex dialectic needs a gloss: montage abstracts elements- 
shots-from their place in order to subordinate them to an artistic plan. 
In doing so it at once deprives them of their rational place in the world, 
but simultaneously supplants that with its own rationalism, an obverse of 
the instrumental rationalism of which it is attempting to be the negation. 
But because montage fails to analyse and expose the elements, it fails 
because they bring with them their existing ideological associations, now 
freed of the complexities of their existence outside the constructed art- 
work. 
We can use another of Peirce's triads to explore this in a different light: 
The First is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything 
nor lying behind anything. The Second is that which is what it is by force 
of something to which it is second. The Third is that which is what it is 
owing to things between which it mediates and which it brings into rela- 
tion (Peirce 1991b, 188-9). 
Untouched by the camera, the peasants' toil is firstness. Imaged, it 
becomes secondness. Assembled into a montage with other shots between 
which it mediates, it becomes thirdness, a language latent in the peasants' 
existence, but exclusive of the peasant. What Willemen seems to want is 
for peasants to be equally present in labour and in montage, but for that 
to  happen the peasants must recognise that they are already mediated 
entities, not 'natural,' pre-linguistic or more properly pro-filmic ones. 
Adorno voices two fears. Firstly, in montage, the stage of secondness 
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infects that of thirdness-the tragic crucifixion of the peasant to the land 
as eternal verity in the style of Millet's Angelus or the cunning born of 
bitterness and tragedy in more contemporary accounts. Secondly, whether 
or not the montage takes account of the trailing ideologemes associated 
with the shot, the shot is assembled into a whole which, as artwork, 
aspires towards a totality which both subsumes the peasants' reality and 
mirrors, albeit negatively, the rationalist universalism of the society it 
attempts to critique. I've been using a related argument in a forthcoming 
chapter on problems of convergence in multimedia: neither hierarchical 
nor organic metaphors hold good of the democratising principles of emer- 
gent media, but montage only works if either its audience can be pre- 
sumed to share the value system that powers the construction of the 
montage (as in MTV editing and televisual flow in general), or by irra- 
tional abnegation of the call to meaning (surrealist montage, sites like 
Potatoland's Landfill). 
So what else is on offer? (and how is this going to bring us to the topic 
of time?) 
When I wrote Digital Aesthetics, I should perhaps have said in the pref- 
ace that the writing was in effect an act of mourning for my mother, who 
died in my arms just before I began work on the manuscript. With her 
went a way of life, at least as far as I was concerned, a courteous, literate, 
considerate way of living. I wanted at one and the same time to find a 
way of holding her legacy in some form of permanence, and of drawing 
from it a negative analysis of the present. As a result I missed a crucial 
factor: that both the dominant and the vanguardist cultures of our times 
already present themselves as negative. It is as if everyone from Madison 
Avenue to Garbage had read Adorno, and that Baudrillard's jeremiads 
had been taken to heart in every Hollywood blockbuster. If in the early six- 
ties, as Adorno penned his masterpiece, Joyce's exile, silence and cunning 
had become the core tools of the last avant-garde (Sartre, Beckett, Celan), 
by the 1990s they were the tools of every Tarantino, Guns and Roses, 
Tracey Emin. As a result, I am increasingly of the opinion that the role of 
contemporary criticism is to go beyond negativity, but without surrender 
to nostalgia; to go beyond Adorno, but to do so with cold, clear eyes. 
The negation of the negation is positive only in the end result: it is still 
as meticulously stark a programme as Adorno set himself forty years ago. 
The task commences in the interrogation of time, and especially in the 
construction of the eternal present not only in consumer capital and the 
spatialisation of cyberculture, but in the triumphal nihilism of the best of 
North Atlantic thinkers from Baudrillard to Vattimo. It is essential to  
understand in the present the actually existing moment of the becoming 
of the future. Under the conditions of accelerated modernity, the present 
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is already past redemption. The battleground is now the actual emergence 
of the future. Corporate long-term planning is not the only force at stake 
in digital culture: we can learn from the cunning exiles of modernity that 
stealth and initiative can succeed in the guerrilla war at the frontier 
between the colonisation of the future and its construction. Artists, 
activists, audiences are now in a better position than ever to take up arms 
in the struggle for what does not yet exist. To do so we cannot afford nos- 
talgia. We have to seize the instruments available, and make work that is 
better than The Matrix. 
How better? 
2. Precepts for a digital artwork 
The primary task of the contemporary artwork is not to represent an 
object world to a subject supposed to have a monopoly on consciousness. 
That task belonged to an historical epoch when the emergent and then 
triumphant industrial bourgeoisie required an artistic and scientific cul- 
ture to promote the philosophy of willed domination over an alienated 
nature and an objectified, and, to that extent, also alienated industrial 
class structure. Industrial capital created a culture of materials, including 
technology and the labour force, that required the form-giving principles 
of an industrial aesthetic, focused on the intensely local hub of manufac- 
ture: the factory. Industrial networks were a function of their nodes. 
In the information economy, the nodes are functions of their networks. 
The global today is necessarily prior to  the local, especially those locali- 
ties which, like the border free trade zones of Tijuana studied by Coco 
Fusco, are sites of oppression. The reality of a woman forced into prosti- 
tution by the strategic requirements of the global economy cannot be pho- 
tographed. No indexical account, anchored in the preeminence of the 
local in industrial culture, would be sufficient to understand the forces 
acting on her. A photograph would only stir the sentimentality defined a 
hundred years ago by the novelist Meredith: pleasure without responsibil- 
ity. Responsibility today derives not from empathy, in any case a metro- 
politan prurience, but from understanding the networks that force her 
into this double economic and sexual oppression, the task of an iconic 
art, and the symbolic regimes that describe, define and give meaning both 
to her experience and to that of her oppressors, who include every user of 
the computers she builds when not supplementing her non-union subsis- 
tence wages with sex labour in the tourist economy. The digital artwork 
must be networked, and the formation of alternative networks is a critical 
function of them. 
An artwork is material, and an artwork that fails to take account of its 
materiality fails to that extent. Digital materials are no exception. What 
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is vital in the indexical quality of media arts is not that they point away 
from themselves towards a recorded past to which is ascribed a reality 
they deny themselves. Rather, digital indexicality presents its own materi- 
ality as what it is-a concrete node constituted in the networks of social 
relationships, including the NAFTA sweatshops. As Margaret Morse 
(1998) argues of digital installation art, the contemporary artwork must 
construct its own locale, not presume it. The embodiment that concerns 
it is not the depicted body abstracted into a type that can be identified as 
the body, but a specific body constructed as local in the locality of the 
installation itself, a unique body which there confronts the imbrication of 
embodiment in the global networks that are brought to bear in the 
devices that surround it. In this way the digital index points not towards 
the recorded past of representation but to the materiality of the present as 
a concrete node of a networked society. The digital artwork must be 
material, and its materiality incorporates the bodies that come into con- 
tact with it and the local space and present time of their CO-existence. 
Which brings us to a crucial issue: the digital artwork is processual. 
When the index depicts its object, it both objectifies that object and pre- 
sents itself as another object standing over against the depicted. But in the 
information economy, objectality is a secondary effect of primary flows, 
an argument made as forcefully by urbanists like Saskia Sassen (1991) and 
Manuel Castells (1996) as it is by Deleuze and Guattari (1972, 1980). In 
the attempt to image flow, the principle of indexicality itself demands 
abandoning the index as primary resource, since there is no object toward 
which it can stand in any relation. Instead, the intrinsically relational 
symbol takes priority. Information flows are relational first: content, 
expression, even form are secondary to this materiality. If the digital art- 
work is to be adequate to this relational world, it must itself prioritise 
relations. Communication is that relationship which precedes its terms- 
from the same standpoint, a line is no longer the shortest distance 
between two points; instead the terminal points are defined by the activity 
of the line. The active principle of communication defines senders and 
receivers, not vice versa. The material process of establishing relation- 
ships, which I tend to call mediation, is the core task of digital art today. 
It should also be emphasised here that the processes of mediation are not 
necessarily exclusively human. In our field, they also can-and perhaps 
must-engage a relation that determines the material of mediation, the 
technologies employed in it, as a term of the relation. We can no longer 
deploy machines as fixed capital without submitting ourselves to the 
anonymous and to that extent autonomous dead labour of the machine in 
pursuit of that anonymity and autonomy which post-subjectivity seeks in 
mirroring the dissolution of the object in information flows. The digital 
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artwork must mediate, and in submitting to the mediation of technology, 
offer itself to the task of vindicating the generations whose lost lives are 
congealed into the shape of our devices. 
The acceleration of modernity in contemporary societies has reached a 
point at which the pseudo-instantaneous management of data flows has 
resulted in what at first glance appears as a total administration of the 
present. When cultural critics as alert as Paul Virilio describe communica- 
tion as instantaneous, not only do they deny the materiality of mediation; 
they fall into an ideological trap laid precisely by the administration. Dis- 
course that surrenders to the ideology of light-speed communication pre- 
sents as normative the proposition that the present is always already 
documented-represented, distributed, consumed and past. The techno- 
logical fact is that transmission is not only delayed by the institutional 
processing which administration demands, but by the physical limits to 
the speed of electromagnetic wave forms. Very, very fast is still not instan- 
taneous, and the present should never be mistaken for its occupation by 
images of even the most recent past-the one twenty-fifth of a second 
required, for example, to build up an electron scan on a video monitor. 
As process, not object, the digital artwork must inhabit the present as a 
moment of becoming, a moment whose reception is therefore always 
deferred into a future which has not yet become. 
The immediate result of this habitation of the present is that the digital 
artwork is by nature ephemeral. The remarkable archiving of web and net 
art undertaken by Steve Dietz at the Walker Art Gallery is a case in point. 
Dietz is clear as curator, and the design of the frame that surrounds the 
documented sites ensures that any visitor should be too, that what is 
archived here is not art but documentation. The important task of archiv- 
ing does not deny ephemerality: on the contrary, it affirms the gap 
between archive and art, and asserts if anything the necessity of the dis- 
tinction. Like the special effects blockbuster, the digital artwork is con- 
demned to be cutting-edge, but unlike the blockbuster it doesn't suffer 
from the patina of the out-of-date that so rapidly scratches the emulsion 
of films that have passed their sell-by. Instead, that passage into the 
archival ensures both that the code enabling the work becomes a resource 
for other artists ("The writer who does not teach other writers teaches 
no-one9'-Benjamin 1973) at the same time that it ceases to function as 
an occupant of the present. If the web, as auto-surveillant traffic in docu- 
ments, is a self-mapping device, its cartography is itself effervescent-a 
simulation which is no sooner recorded than it becomes defunct. In the 
same way, the instruction set that generates a digital artwork is over as 
soon as it has completed its run. This is why the effects movie is never an 
artwork, and why Photoshop images are so aesthetically moribund: what 
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has been aesthetic in them is the process of making-once that process is 
terminated, the art is over, and what is presented to the public is only its 
discarded archival image. To this extent, whatever is mimetic in the digi- 
tal is a mimesis of a task already accomplished, a body that is already 
past, and as such is excluded from the aesthetics of digital artworks, in 
which the process is as yet unfinished. The mimetic persists, but as a raw 
material for further processes. In this sense, the digital artwork is obliged 
to be incomplete, its ephemerality dependent on the deferral of all goals 
to a time which cannot be achieved in the artwork, but toward which it 
aspires, and in whose direction it gestures. 
Moreover, the ephemerality of the digital is an integral element of its 
formal properties. As Virilio would say, the invention of the computer is 
also of necessity the invention of the computer crash. Many of the most 
significant works-Jodi's are the most obvious-are dependent on the dis- 
ruption of the normative efficiency which has been inscribed into com- 
puter design as an ideology if not a reality. In a recent piece, Lapses and 
Erasures, Sawad Brooks undertakes a related task, writing in a text note 
to the piece: 
In analog media, when something is erased, it is often possible to sense the 
mark left by erasure. Thus Rauschenberg was able to present his "Erased 
de Kooning" drawing as his own (ironically). Erasure leaves its own traces, 
it is writing or drawing. It is a wiping clean which puts forth an order with 
the possibility of decipherment.. . I make drawing interfaces to draw upon 
the erasure of erasure in the realm of the digital (Brooks 2000, np). 
If drawing is a practice in which artists subordinate themselves to the 
activity of the line as to a machine designed to generate a non-volitional 
autonomy from selfhood, as it is in the work of David Connearn, subor- 
dination to the technologies of computer memory offer a further tool: the 
double negation of the erasure which the computer also enables, its 
amnemotechnics, becomes a resource for the construction of the future as 
the erased erasure of the past. The proof is that it is almost impossible to 
erase a file accidentally. Traces remain from which skilled operators can 
retrieve even the most shredded data as, once again, the Microsoft trial 
researchers proved in their fossicking among the dead-letter offices of 
internal e-mails. Erasure is a making of traces in the form of what has 
been erased, but where in analogue media what is revealed is the surface 
which the erased drawing itself erased, in the digital there is no preexist- 
ing surface, only the space created by the act of recording, so that what 
erasure produces is the evidence of a surface that never existed prior to 
the erasure. At the same time, however, the erasure is never complete, but 
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approaches asymptotically to the mystical point of zero existence. Here, 
as in the attempt to make a total artwork, zero resembles infinity more 
than it does unity, and can only be approached by infinitesimal subdivi- 
sions of the existing. Where analogue media had the power to work in the 
binary opposition of presence and absence, the digital are endowed or 
cursed with an inability to deal in absolutes. To this extent then, the digi- 
tal artwork must be imperfect, since it can never achieve either absolute 
existence nor absolute absence. The greatest benefit of this discovery is 
that the imperative towards harmony need not be heeded, and the digital 
is thus freed of the necessity of harmonising formally a world which is, in 
all its relations, so profoundly inharmonious. The digital is profoundly 
incapable of that perfected harmony in which the ideological tasks of 
societies are achieved under the guise of the autonomous artwork. 
The processual nature of digital art makes it incomplete and imperfect, 
in the sense that it cannot achieve the absolute completion and perfection 
of pure presence. In fact that metaphysics of presence, abandoned first by 
mathematics in the mid nineteenth century, now haunts, as absence, only 
the transitory sublime of annihilation as special effect. Nonetheless, 
though practice has all but abandoned it, the sublime still haunts contem- 
porary aesthetics from Adorno to Danto as both the Kantian marvelling 
at domination and its negation-the abjection of the subject. This unap- 
petising metaphysical binary suits the times, as visible in the new cult of 
Bataille as it is in the neo-Kantianism of Lyotard's late writings. The 
result is a performance, typical of idealist metaphysics, that simulates the 
aesthetic dialectic in the static play of a rationallirrational binary that 
merely enacts modernity's logic of efficiency and degradation. In aesthetic 
terms, here rigor mortis masquerades as danse macabre. It fails not so 
much because of this stasis, however, nor because of its misreading of the 
present as 'what is the case,' but because it takes reason and unreason as 
essential terms in an epoch in which essences no longer pertain. What dis- 
tinguishes the digital artwork is its elegance, in the sense intended by 
David Gelernter: its clarity, economy of means, operational grace. 
This is not to say that digital artworks are passionless and formalist. 
On the contrary: the hall of binary mirrors that traps essentialist art pro- 
duces that affectless manipulation of tear ducts, erections and fight-or- 
flight adrenal secretions in sedentary and stultified consumers. It is rather 
the case that the characteristic emotions of digital artworks-the move- 
ment through disorientation to new orientation, for example, in a dislo- 
cated place, the gasp at beauty realised on the wing, the complex humour 
of, for example, the First International Competition of Form Art-are 
more subtly and actively conformed to the changed character of acceler- 
ated modernity. They are, in a word, necessary. The digital artwork must 
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be necessary: its elegance is a function of the need for the work. That 
need can no longer be formed as expression, although it remains true that 
contemporary capital is ever more dependent on the hyperindividuated 
narcissism of the competitive corporate playpen, and an art that pretends 
to bypass that lens of subjectivity thereby fails to respond to the necessity 
of individuation as a passage through which a work moves. Expression 
remains, but now as the anonymous product of autonomous networks. 
Aesthetic necessity arises at once from the fact of flow, its mediations 
and the temporalities they engender. The tendency of capital is toward 
monopoly; that of its flows toward domination. Control over financial 
flows in particular is the goal of transnational capital. But this goal is 
realisable only in the eradication of difference, that difference which pro- 
duces flow from one place to another. That difference, since it cannot be 
eradicated systemically without destroying the flows themselves, is now 
displaced into the managed future of corporate planning, most directly in 
the simulation of futures markets. But when the future is evoked as the 
basis of global stability, capital faces a crisis of unpredictability. As ideol- 
ogy, future modelling depends on ever more refined data sets and ever 
more rigorous algorithms for their projection. But it is precisely in com- 
puter modelling that the problem of turbulence is posed most categori- 
cally. Not only definitionally but technically, the future resists modelling. 
By dint of its pseudo-theological position in the regime of global data 
flows and their perpetually deferred promise of perpetually deferred pay- 
ment, the future is held to vindicate the claims of the present to wholeness 
and completion. But the deferral on which that wholeness rests denies 
that wholeness to it. As the active relationality of networks, mediation, by 
definition in process and incomplete, is thus forced to pretend to a com- 
pletion to which it cannot attain. It materiality is deferred into the not-yet 
as the price of its present functioning (a state of affairs that generates the 
illusion of static binary oppositions). This contradiction in turn generates 
the digital aesthetic as its necessary outcome: the materiality is restored to 
the present, while the function is shifted into the unforeseeable future. 
Hegel's concept of art as the consciousness of need is the inspiration for 
this insight, but as the digital aesthetic arises from the relationality of 
global networks inclusive of human and machine components, that con- 
sciousness is now not individual or even merely social, but cyborg. The 
digital artwork is cyborg: it responds to the institutional, economic and 
discursive formation of corporations as actually existing cyborgs by 
building an alternative consciousness in which the mechanical is no 
longer the object of domination but integral partner in the production of 
culture. Neither the consciousness under construction nor the need to 
which art responds are then entirely or purely human. 
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In order for the future to be held up as the settling of accounts on the 
promissory notes of the economic, political and ecological present, it is 
essential for the administration of global data flows that the future be iso- 
lated from the present, so that the promised completion on the deals 
which are the dominant mode of communication today need never arise. 
Here a specifically temporal contradiction arises: the difference between 
future and present is both affirmed and eradicated. The future must be 
both continuous with the present (all debts depend on the concept that 
they can eventually be paid) and entirely divorced from it (since debt is 
the motor of financial flows, they must never be allowed to be paid). It is 
this faultline of difference between present and future that requires the 
digital as its necessary outcome: its elegance derives in part from its deter- 
mination as the inhabitance of the present as difference. The digital art- 
work has no choice but to affirm the immanence of the future at the point 
of its emergence. 
The necessity of the digital artwork is then not organic in the sense pro- 
pounded by Romantic aesthetic philosophy, since it necessarily abjures 
wholeness. Instead, the digital works at the level of mediation as the 
unhappy conscience of dominant communication, a cyborg will to grace. 
The digital is then communicative rather than representational. This 
places it in opposition to  the evolution of e-cash as the supposedly imma- 
terial universal signifier of all exchange values, promoting the substi- 
tutability of everything for anything. Asserting aesthetic difference 
restores neither the individuality of objects nor the objectality of individu- 
als, the reciprocal functioning of index and identity resulting from indus- 
trial modes of communication. Instead it assets the primacy of mediation, 
of the material of relations. In this perspective, the digital artwork can be 
assessed according to the breadth, depth and complexity of the networks 
it engages or engenders. Unlike Deleuzean difference, however, aesthetic 
difference is not an absolute horizon external to all humanity and all 
communication, but a difference intrinsic to  communication which, 
viewed outside the confining determinations of the actually existing his- 
torical conditions, is defined by its tendency towards inclusiveness and its 
capacity for translation, misunderstanding and so for interpretation and 
systemic innovation. Communication's own need, bred in the interface of 
combined human and technological networks, is that of a newly cyborg 
communicative species for inclusion and autonomy. The digital is the nec- 
essary next phase in this historical process, a process which I believe is 
synonymous with history: hastening the globalisation of the mediating 
infrastructure while driving forward those internal contradictions that 
make the global and deferred information economy unthinkably neither 
present nor future. Like Ed Dorn's railway wagon, everything is behind 
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and nothing in front. Mediation is the activity through which the hybrid 
communicative species become, and specifically how they become other 
than they now are. 
When, as D.N. Rodowick explains, Deleuze argues that "what philoso- 
phy resists" is "the globalization and banalization of information as a 
power that affirms the dominance of late capitalism" (Rodowick 1997, 
192), we perceive both the binarism that hog-ties Deleuze's philosophy 
for lack of a dialectic, and the weakness of a politics that relies on the 
unequal struggle of philosophy against world capitalism. You can be 
guaranteed that philosophy will only ever resist, and that it will never tri- 
umph. Against this brave, pious but ineffectual quietism, and against 
what Eco (Eco 1986, 93) refers to as the "negative theology" of philo- 
sophical nihilism from Heidegger to Baudrillard, the digital artwork must 
be communicative, for only communication is vast enough and necessary 
enough to endure and to overcome the vicissitudes through which it is 
being tortured in the age in which communication is information, infor- 
mation is power, and money and data are electronically indistinguishable. 
The implication of the theses of ephemerality and communication is 
that the digital has an altered relation with consumption. Much electronic 
art owed and owes its genesis to the conceptual art of the 1970s and to 
the critique of the commodity that gave rise to media as varied as 
LeWitt's instruction sets, the Situationist dCrive and the community work- 
shop and newsreel movements. But now that the commodity itself is in a 
state of implosion, a vacuity both raged against and celebrated in the rage 
of mainstream culture from Tarantino to rap, the focus of the digital is 
shifting from the provision of objects whose contemplation exposes the 
emptiness of the commodity towards building encounters for participa- 
tion. This has little to do with what is usually referred to by the term 
interaction. It concerns rather factors such as the level of skill required of 
both producers and participants in digital artworks. The digital artwork 
demands that audiences acquire a determinate set of skills and under- 
standing~ to participate fully in the work. In Toshio Iwai's Resonance of 
Four, for example, there is a default state which is pretty but dull, while 
random gestures with the track ball will produce interactive 'rewards,' 
coloured lights and sounds. But the experience of the work as artwork 
demands both understanding the principle of the device as a composing 
machine, and working in consort with three other users to create music. 
Artisanship is integral to  the digital: so the best artists are also either 
engineers or groups including technologists and programmers, and so our 
students demand of us programming skills more than bundled packages. 
This goes against the current of the televisualisation of the web, where the 
end-user defined html language is being submerged in a wave of server- 
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defined Javascript while, as Tim Berners-Lee (1999) argues, the full inter- 
active power of alternatives like the Linux-based Amaya browser remain 
unexplored and marginalised. The old balance cannot be restored: 
instead, it must be remade, as it is in interventions like The Webstalker 
that not only offer control but demand active participation. Something 
similar is true of RTMark's web works, which imitate the control struc- 
tures of corporate web-design but demand action if they are to be experi- 
enced not as parody but as art. 
Digital media are grounded in work in a second sense: to return to an 
earlier theme, electronic media are grounded not in leisure, as the televi- 
sualisation of the web insists, but in the workplace. In place of the elite 
contemplation of the refined consumer, the digital artwork demands the 
intellectual and emotional graft needed to change the work into some- 
thing else, very clearly in the collective montage projects now such an 
integral part of web art, but also in projects like Sera Furneaux's Kissing 
Booth, where users not only orchestrate virtual kisses but record their 
own into the booth's database. In this instance, the work does not exist 
until the user provides the input. This culture of the database is akin to 
activist post-artworks like the SOS Racisme mail-bombing of Le Pen's 
National Front, or the Zapatista Interneta's of the Frankfurt stock 
exchange. Conceptualism left a legacy of anti-commodity art: its dialecti- 
cal outcome is a pro-work work. The digital artwork is work, a labour 
shared in the human-computer interface and, like any work, founded in a 
social process that demands cooperation among workers, and between 
workers and those anonymous forebears whose skills are enshrined and 
concretised in the dead labour of our machines. 
As work, the digital requires the shared labour, specifically, of artist 
and audience, to the extent that the distinction begins to blur. To what 
extent are Audio-ROM the authors of a sound piece I might make with 
their programmes and interfaces but using my own samples and, since the 
coding is open, my own coding too? On the one hand, this scares those 
brought up in the expressive ideology of the art schools, and on the other 
the pious elitism of humanist scholars who, thirty years ago, leapt at the 
novel focus of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 
to abandon attempts to understand labour. Yet work is today a curiously 
liberating principle. To the extent that artists relinquish control over the 
artwork and, to that extent, over the audience, the audience must assume 
the same degree of responsibility for the work that the artist has aban- 
doned in offering it to them. Without that assumption of responsibility, 
the artwork resorts to the default state of older art: passivity and what we 
must now understand as the anaesthetic. The digital artwork demands 
responsibility: there is no art where the audience does not take up this 
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gauntlet and where instead it reserves for itself the sentimental position, 
enjoyment without responsibility. This is the burden of Eduardo Kac's 
Teleporting an Unknown State, in which the survival of a small plant 
depended on CUSeeMe clients providing it with remote sunlight, or Ken 
Goldberg's Telegarden which depended on telerobotic users to tend the 
garden. Likewise, since even in death the labour of past centuries is still 
exploited, the digital artwork's destiny is to redeem and liberate the con- 
cretised labour embodied in our communicative machines. That is how 
the past becomes future, beyond the old lie of posterity. After all, we are 
the future that our ancestors looked to to judge and justify them, and we 
are not worthy-unless we seize the present as the becoming of their 
future. This is the responsibility which we take up, the only people among 
all the humans who have ever lived, who are alive now. 
Under the existing circumstances difference is not a given, a foundation 
(however complex) or a horizon but a job of work: making a difference. 
Communication, under the historical conditions of contemporary capital, 
can no longer be presumed as an a-historical given. In a time in which it is 
almost entirely identifiable with the circulations of global finance, such 
that our consumption of commodities even is merely a necessary moment 
in the circuits of capital, communication must be fabricated, since it is no 
longer natural. On this fabrication depends the making of a culture that is 
no longer crowned by the negation of its own negativity, as remains the 
case with accelerated modernity. Instead, the digital must turn towards 
the positive construction of the present as difference, a creation that only 
becomes possible in the era of a planetary communications infrastructure. 
As construction, the digital must forswear the sublime, for the sublime 
confronts us not as the incomprehensible but as the incommunicable, an 
absolute horizon beyond history. To construct is to act historically, to 
embrace the interests, human and technological, that have been left so 
egregiously unsatisfied by the culture of the commodity, itself increasingly 
embraced in the anaesthetic of its own sublime absence from itself. 
Change is the quality of history and of beauty-what is transient, what 
comes into being in the moment as the emergence of futurity. The digital 
artwork must be beautiful. 
These explorations can be summarised in terms of a series of principles 
I have tried to voice here: 
The digital artwork must be networked 
The digital artwork must be material 
The digital artwork is processual 
The digital artwork must mediate 
The digital artwork must inhabit the present as a moment of becoming 
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The digital artwork is obliged to be incomplete 
The digital artwork is by nature ephemeral 
The digital artwork must be imperfect 
What distinguishes the digital artwork is its elegance 
The digital artwork must be necesary 
The digital artwork is cyborg 
The digital artwork must be communicative 
Artisanship is integral to the digital 
The digital artwork is work 
The digital artwork demands responsibility 
The digital artwork must be beautiful 
The digital is a malleable aesthetics (Deck 1999), based on the principle 
that anything that can be made can be remade. Where the artworks of the 
industrial era hover between existence and non-existence, presence and 
absence, the digital seizes on the not-yet for its own domain at the 
moment of its emergence. Its time is the time of becoming. The cost is 
great: the loss of permanence, of authority, of wholeness. As work, the 
artwork that ceases to transform the emergence of the future ceases to be 
art and becomes archive: the vibration of binary industrial-era art no 
longer animates the dimodt. The innocence of play is denied us in a time 
when play has become a key strategy of the corporate management of cre- 
ativity in hock to the production of new consumer goods. We may no 
longer inhabit the present for its own sake, as the impressionists and the 
Lumisre brothers could, but only for the sake of a future for which we are 
enjoined to take responsibility. The great negation which guided the 
avant-gardes of the twentieth century no longer holds in the twenty-first, 
and without that guide, we risk the sentimental positivity of Ewoks and 
tamagotchis. Most of all, we suffer the immense burden of beauty, the ter- 
rible onus of bringing into existence. But on the positive side, we have the 
whole of history, its staggering defeats and millennia of immiseration, to 
propel us into the new. 
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